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In this article, I argue for a critical recognition of the law of the sea, as it developed from the 
post-War period, as fostering a ‘grab’ of the ocean floor, via national jurisdiction and 
international administration. I discuss why we should view what might be discussed otherwise 
as an ‘enclosure’ or ‘incorporation’ of the ocean floor within the state system at its grab. I 
then trace the grounds on which the ocean was brought within national and international 
regimes: the ocean floor’s geography and economic value. Both were asserted as givens, that 
is, as purely factual, but they were, in fact, reified through law. The article thus calls attention 
to the law’s constitutive effects. I examine the making of this law, showing that law-making by 
governments was influenced by acts of representation and narrative-creation by many non-
state actors. It was informed by both economic and non-economic influences, including 
political solidarity and suspicion, and parochial as well as cosmopolitan urges. Moreover, the 
law did not develop gradually or consistently. In exploring its development, I bring into focus 
the role played by one influential group of actors—international lawyers themselves.  
 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, newspapers have carried stories about the ‘Ocean Spiral’ project of the Shimizu 
Corporation of Japan.1 The project, undertaken in cooperation with the Japan Agency for 
Marine-Earth Science and Technology, aims to build a mini-city inside an ocean-floating 
sphere connected to the seabed via a long spiral stem.2 With a hoped-for completion date of 
2030, the sphere will house 5000 residents. It will bob ‘like a spaceship’ just beneath the sea’s 
surface, protected from ‘typhoons or earthquakes’. It will have a sea-facing ‘Casual Zone’; a 
central ‘Business Zone’; and residences, research laboratories, and retail and convention 
facilities. The spiral stem, dotted with smaller monitoring stations, will provide a pathway for 
transporting people and resources, to and from the ocean floor. The base, planted three or four 
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kilometres below the ocean surface, will serve as an ‘Earth Factory’ for storage and reuse of 
carbon dioxide, and cultivation of deep-sea resources, biological —‘branded seafood’—and 
mineral. The whole will be powered by the ocean’s thermal energy. 
This seemingly fantastic proposal is but the latest in a line of architectural designs for human 
occupation of the sea. Many such emerged in the long 1960s: years in which decolonization-
linked anxieties about overpopulation, resource-erosion and environmental degeneration on 
land, met a growing intimacy with the sea, as ‘a territory that could be scouted, explored, 
mapped, colonised and connected to the land and its economies.’3  
This intimacy owed partly to the Cold War, with submarine deterrence forming a major 
component of the military strategies of both blocs. Military planning also catalysed the United 
States’ ‘Man-in-the-Sea’ program, which aimed to place human beings in the ocean deeps for 
sustained periods of time to facilitate espionage and recovery of military hardware.4 Much like 
the International Space Station today, deep-submerged ‘SeaLabs’ were to provide the 
residential base from which ‘aquanauts’ could conduct their activities.  
Commercial interests and techno-scientific progress also contributed to a view of the sea as 
something more than a navigational surface or fishing commons—as containing places, in fact, 
for fixed capital investment.5 This understanding speedily took root with respect to coastal 
fisheries and oil reserves of the continental shelf (i.e. the shallow seabed contiguous to the 
coast) in the post-War period. Improvements in technology made it possible to drill the 
continental shelf at increasing depths, farther from the coastline. By the early 1960s, mining 
for hard minerals—diamonds off the Namibian coast, tin off Thailand, zirconium off Australia, 
and gold off Alaska—followed.6  
                                                          
3 Kaji-o'grady and Raisbeck, ‘Prototype cities in the sea’, 10 Journal of Architecture (2005) 443, at 444-445. As 
to literature reflective of the anxieties of the time see for instance: G. Hardin (ed.), Population, Evolution and 
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Ranganathan, ‘Global Commons’, 27 European Journal of International Law (2016) 693.  
4 J.P. Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea (2001), at 143ff. Craven was the Chief 
Scientist of the US Navy’s Special Projects Office during the Cold War, responsible for the design of nuclear 
submarines and espionage technologies. A detailed account is also offered in B. Hellwarth, Sealab: America’s 
Forgotten Quest to Live and Work on the Ocean Floor (2012).  
5 P. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (2001), at 180ff.   




Moreover, the late 1950s, including the first ever ‘International Geophysical Year’, and 1960s, 
were a time of rapid advancement in knowledge about the deep ocean floor. Researchers at the 
Lamont Geological Observatory, New York (now the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory), 
produced the first physio-geographic maps of its topography.7 Others, from the Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography, California and the US Office of Naval Research, inaugurated an 
ambitious project to drill all the way through its crust to the Earth’s mantle, catalysing rapid 
development of deep-sea drilling capabilities.8 Not coincidentally, it was discovered that the 
deep seabed too contained major mineral reserves, in the form of polymetallic nodules 
containing manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel and iron.9 These metals were then in uncertain 
supply on land, both for political reasons, and due to their erosion. The mining industry began 
to germinate plans for their extraction on a commercial scale.10 Amidst the increasing 
fascination with the oceans, then, the seabed emerged as an area of importance.  
Until the 1940s, the principle of the freedom of the seas had provided the underpinnings of the 
largely uncodified international law of the sea. While the ‘cannon-shot rule’ had gradually 
formalized into a rule permitting coastal states to exercise sovereign control over a stretch 
(usually 3M) of the waters and seabed adjacent to the coast, the rest had remained open for 
fishing and navigation.11 But much broader national claims were made in the years after the 
Second World War. The two Truman Proclamations of 1945 were the critical event in this 
regard: one asserted US jurisdiction over resources of the continental shelf; the other 
established zones in which fisheries would be subject to US regulation.12 Claims by other states 
followed; and a series of developments in the law culminating in the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC),13 resulted in ‘forty percent or more of ocean space’ becoming 
                                                          
7 D. Lawrence, Upheaval from the Abyss: Ocean Floor Mapping and the Earth Science Revolution (2002), at 
234ff. 
8 K.J. Hsü, Challenger at Sea: A Ship that Revolutionized Earth Science (1992), at 11ff. Novelist John Steinbeck 
chronicled the conduct of ‘Project Mohole’ (as it was called) from on-broad the drilling ship: ‘High Drama of 
Bold Thrust through the Ocean Floor’, Life Magazine, 14 April 1961, at 111.  
9 The nodules had been first found decades before, by the famous Challenger Expedition of 1872-76, but forgotten, 
there being no practical possibility of their large-scale recovery at that time.  
10 The International Nickel Company (INCO) was one of the first to engage in this endeavour: see Shaw, ‘Nodule 
Mining – Three Miles Deep!’, 11 Marine Georesources and Geotechnology (1993) 181. Shaw headed INCO’s 
nodule mining initiative. 
11 Crawford and Viles, ‘International Law on a Given Day’, in J. Crawford, International Law as an Open system: 
Selected Essays (2002) 69, at 75-76. As the authors point out, before World War II, all states agreed on the three-
mile limit, but for some it represented a minimum claim. 
12 Proclamation 2668-Policy of the United States with respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High 
Seas; and Proclamation 2667-Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and 
Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 28 September 1945.  
13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 1833 UNTS 3. 
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subject to assertions of national jurisdiction.14 The LOSC also limited access to some spaces 
beyond national jurisdiction: it placed the deep seabed under the exclusive administration of 
an International Seabed Authority (ISA), whose permission is essential for exploration and 
exploitation of that area’s mineral resources.  
Thus, within a span of half a century, the seabed passed from a space governed by the principle 
of freedom to one enclosed within national or international regimes. I trace that transition in 
this article, exploring the grounds on which this enclosure was achieved. These grounds 
included the ocean floor’s geography and economic value. Both were asserted as givens, i.e. as 
purely factual, although they were, in fact, reified through law. The article thus calls attention 
to the law’s constitutive effects, showing that it fostered an extractive imaginary of the ocean 
floor. I examine how this law was formed, showing that law-making by governments was 
influenced by acts of representation and narrative-creation by many non-state actors. Apart 
from economic interests, it was also fed by several non-economic influences: political 
solidarity and suspicion, parochial as well as cosmopolitan urges. Moreover, this law did not 
develop gradually or consistently. In exploring its development, I further seek to bring into 
focus the role played by one particularly influential group of actors—international lawyers 
themselves, practitioners as well as academics.  
I do not claim to offer a comprehensive treatment of the above points; that would rightly entail 
a book-length analysis. I hope, however, to urge us toward a critical recognition of the law of 
the sea, as it developed from the post-War period, as fostering a grab of the ocean (floor), via 
national jurisdiction and international administration. And, simultaneously, I seek to 
contextualise this outcome, calling attention to the factors shaping the choices made.15 The 
driver of this article should be obvious: that increasing concerns about the health of the 
oceans—articulated for example at the UN Ocean Conference of 2017—tend to pinpoint 
international law as purely the source of solutions to these concerns, ignoring that it may have 
also contributed to the problem.16 The implication is that the very initiatives that call for new 
                                                          
14 Pardo, ‘Before and After’, 46 Law and Contemporary Problems (1983) 95, at 101. While forty per cent was 
Pardo’s estimate, others, like Churchill and Lowe, cite a figure of 36 per cent: R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The 
Law of the Sea (3rd edn, 1999), at 162; this figure, based on the universal establishment of exclusive economic 
zones, assumes claims up to 200 miles only, and thus excludes claims over the extended continental shelf.  
15 In which regard, see especially Marks, ‘False Contingency’ 62 Current Legal Problems (2009) 1.   
16 See e.g. the Outcome Document of the UN Ocean Conference: ‘Our Ocean, Our future: call for action’, GA 
Res. 71/312, 6 July 2017. The Resolution provides: ‘We affirm the need to enhance the conservation and 
sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use 
of oceans and their resources…’ (Annex, Para 11).  
5 
 
legal responses caution that these should not undermine the existing regimes.17 While 
understandable, this caution is also a constraint on what these legal responses need to do: i.e. 
overcome not just given facts but rather an imaginary of law’s own creation. That imaginary, 
privileging extraction, meanwhile continues to flourish and be extended through such 
initiatives as the above-described Ocean Spiral project.    
II. Why call it a ‘grab’?  
I would like to begin with the question that might arise at this point: why characterise the 
enclosure of the seabed as its ‘grab’? It is worth recalling that that term and its equivalents were 
employed to describe various jurisdictional assertions at their times. The Truman Proclamation 
on the Continental Shelf was called a land grab, as were the responses to it from Latin American 
states, which made more extensive claims, encompassing 200M of the seabed and waters.18 
The definition of the continental shelf under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(CCS), adopted to settle these claims, was regarded as paving the way for land grab.19 Maltese 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo’s landmark speech to the United Nations—which catalysed 
negotiation of the LOSC—described a colonial-era style ‘scramble’ as the imminent future to 
be feared for the deep seabed.20 US President Richard Nixon’s suggestion, in response, for the 
creation of a seabed ‘trusteeship zone’ was decried as land grab by developing states.21 And, 
while all of these referred to the incorporation of the seabed within national jurisdiction, the 
language of grab was also used vis-à-vis the placement of the deep seabed under international 
administration: the LOSC seabed regime was described by its critics as the greatest land grab 
of all, that threatened commercial enterprise by vesting control of the seabed in ‘a kind of 
supergovernment answerable to no one’.22  
                                                          
17 The same paragraph provides: ‘We emphasize that our actions to implement Goal 14 should be in accordance 
with, reinforce and not duplicate or undermine existing legal instruments, arrangements, processes, mechanisms 
or entities.’ Id.  
18 E.g. Waldock, ‘The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf’, 36 Transactions of the Grotius Society 
(TGS) (1950) 115; Ratiner, ‘United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis’, 2 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce (1971) 225, at 227.   
19 499 UNTS 311; e.g. Friedmann, ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases -A Critique’, 64 American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) (1970) 229, at 240; RP Anand, Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and the Developing 
Countries (1976), at 119ff 
20 UN General Assembly, First Committee Debate, UN Docs. A/C.1/PV.1515–1516, 1 November 1967, para 56ff. 
Pardo also used the term grab in his writings on the issue at the time: e.g. Pardo, ‘Who will control the seabed’, 
47 Foreign Affairs (1968-1969) 123, at 133.  
21 See papers on the Pacem in Maribus conference in Malta (1970), FCO 76/161, UK National Archives, London.  
22 E.g. Ely, ‘One OPEC is Enough!’, 5 Regulation (1981) 19.  
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But I do not use the term merely for sake of fidelity with these utterances. Rather, the term 
brings into view two related points: Firstly, and to put it in plain terms, the extensions of 
national and international jurisdiction have configured the ocean floor into a series of extraction 
sites principally for the benefit of a few states and corporations.23 Secondly, this configuration 
has relied on – and continues to draw legitimacy from – a construction of the seabed as socio-
culturally, economically and ecologically disembedded, i.e., as remote, insulated, and lacking 
local constituencies or pre-existing ‘systems of meaning and practice’ that would be ousted by 
the ‘narrow predication of “universal interest”’ on its mining potential.24 This allows the 
extension of national and international jurisdiction to be discussed viewed as the ‘inclusion’ or 
‘incorporation’ of the ocean floor within international law – terms that signify changes of 
status, but play down the effects of those changes. In contrast, the term ‘grab’ has an obviously 
relational character, signifying that allocating mining rights to companies or (nominally) to 
mankind entailed, and will further entail, dispossessions of various kinds.25  
Indeed, the view of the seabed as disembedded does not enjoy much stability in practice. 
Operations on the continental shelf are axes of tension in many parts of the world. Consider 
only the example of New Zealand, where proposed projects of sand dredging and mineral 
extraction are being resisted by the activist initiative Kiwis Against Seabed Mining (KASM), 
with the slogan ‘Don’t steel our sand’.26 The projects represent threats to the way of life of the 
state’s various coastal communities, especially indigenous ones. In relation to an application 
by Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd to mine iron-sands off the South Taranaki coast, New 
Zealand’s Environmental Protection Agency received 13,733 submissions, of which only one 
favoured the project. Several were from Maori iwi worried about the project’s economic and 
cultural impacts, since it threatened their customary fisheries and environmental stewardship. 
Other submissions, from a variety of groups including fishers and environmentalists further 
                                                          
23 On the point of who benefits by seabed mining, see Isabel Feichtner’s contribution to this symposium. 
24 Ince, ‘Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A Theoretical Intervention’, 79 
Rural Sociology (2014) 104, at 127.  
25 I follow here Susan Marks’ suggestion for the use of transitive concepts such as exploitation and displacement, 
that express direct actions on people and things, and call attention to the relational character of social phenomena 
such as deprivation and privilege: Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’, 74 Modern Law Review (2011) 57, 
at 76; see also, and importantly, Marks, ‘Exploitation as an International Legal Concept’ in S. Marks (ed.) 
International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (2008), at 281.  
26 What is KASM, available at http://kasm.org.nz/inside-kasm/about/.  
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pointed out the threats to the waters, commercial fisheries, human health, the ecosystem, 
coastal seabirds, and tourism, from the proposed mining project.27  
What about the deep seabed? While its depth and distance may feed the perception that it is 
disconnected from coastal political economies, the fact is that deep seabed mining will not take 
place in isolation from land-based processing and transportation; and will influence the 
development of new coastal economies.28 Moreover, past practice shows that there are few 
parts of the seabed so distant that some community will not declare ‘local’ interest in it. In 
1974, in response to a CIA venture to recover a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific 
seabed under the cover story that a private corporation was engaging in seabed mining, 
Hawaiian officials and local industry—taken in by the cover story—expressed concern that the 
corporation would extract all the minerals from that area. They regarded these minerals, which 
they had no independent capability to exploit (and which were located 1560M northwest of 
Hawaii, beyond claimable national jurisdiction) as their local resources.29 Even setting aside 
such direct claims, the prospect of seabed mining has consistently generated fears of in situ 
dispossession amongst land-based producers—many of them industries in developing states—
of cobalt, nickel, and manganese. During the LOSC negotiations, these states had thus pressed 
for production limitations on seabed minerals. Constructions of the deep seabed as remote also 
neglect the widespread ecological implications of seabed mining.30 The example of French 
nuclear tests in the Pacific lagoons and the later discovery of threats of contamination for states 
like New Zealand—at a distance of 2590M—should caution against presumptions that parts of 
the ocean are far enough away.31  
There may be, however, at least two objections to my suggestion that the extension of national 
and international jurisdiction over the seabed should be regarded as its grab. Firstly, that in 
doing so, I draw too great a contrast with the law that preceded the post-War developments. 
                                                          
27 Analysis of submissions report: Trans-Tasman Resources, February 2017, available at 
https://www.epa.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Documents/Marine-Activities-EEZ/Activities/TTRL-AOS.pdf. The 
EPA’s decision to grant consent to the project was quashed on appeal by the High Court in August 2018; 
proceedings are now pending before the Court of Appeal.   
28 For a related account of how the laying of submarine communications cables have shaped coastal economies, 
see N. Starosielski, The Undersea Network (2015).  
29 R. Varner and W. Collier, A Matter of Risk (1978), at 188. Collier was part of the CIA mission. For further 
information on the mission, see ‘Project Azorian – The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer’, declassified by the 
CIA on 1 January 2010, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb305/doc01.pdf.  
30 Wedding et al., ‘Managing mining of the deep seabed’, 349 Science (2015) 144.  
31 See Application Instituting Proceedings, Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with 
Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) paras. 
19-20 (Int’l Ct. Justice Aug. 21, 1995). 
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Was not the ‘old’ law of the sea equally oriented towards the exploitation of the sea’s 
resources?  Secondly, that my characterization obscures real differences between the current 
seabed regimes, and reductively places all of them within the same rubric.  
As to the first objection, it is true: the old law of the sea, i.e. the principle of freedom, favoured 
certain economic uses and users. Intellectual histories of Grotius’s Mare Liberum have shown 
that it was written in accordance with the Dutch East India Company’s interests in navigation 
to and trade with the East Indies; it argued freedom against Portuguese claims of exclusive 
right.32 Grotius further emphasized the freedom to fish in support of the Dutch herring industry, 
against objections that the Scottish coastal seas should be closed to foreign fishing operations.33 
Dutch maritime superiority provided the context for these arguments; the Dutch would soon be 
making their own arguments for the sea’s enclosure against other users.34 Assertions of the 
sea’s freedom and enclosure have thus obviously had a material basis, and in this respect the 
post-War legal developments continue a longer theme. But, the significance of these post-War 
developments should not be discounted. The form of exploitation that they permit, i.e. large-
scale mining operations, and the types of social, economic and ecological dispossessions that 
these threaten, would not be possible without the security of tenure over parts of the seabed 
that the ‘new’ law of the sea permits states and the ISA to grant to corporations.  
The second objection is also pertinent. The legal regimes that enclose the seabed certainly differ 
from each other in the limits and costs they impose upon mining companies. The regime 
administered by the ISA includes a redistributive component, on the principle that the deep 
seabed is the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (CHM).35 Meanwhile, national regimes for the 
use of the continental shelf vary; some may be more socially inclusive and ecologically 
sensitive than others. (Sceptical views as well as undoubting ones have sought to account for 
this.36) I will return to these issues in section IV; however, that some regimes might be ‘better’ 
than others does not undo the key point that the law has reified an extractive imaginary of the 
                                                          
32 Grotius, ‘The Free Sea’ ([1609] R. Hakluyt trans.), reprinted in D. Armitage (ed.) The Free Sea (2004), at 1. 
For contextualisations of Grotius’s work, see, e.g., Armitage, The Free Sea, ibid., at xi; M. van Ittersum, Profit 
and Principle: Hugo Grotius Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies (1595-1615) 
(2006).  
33 See Welwod, Of the Community and Propriety of the Seas [1613], reprinted in Armitage, The Free Sea, ibid., 
at 63; Grotius, ‘Defense of Chapter V of the Mare Liberum’, reprinted in Armitage, The Free Sea, ibid., at 75. 
34 Armitage, Introduction, ibid., at xx. 
35 The seabed beyond national jurisdiction is designated as such in Art 136, LOSC and the Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, GA Res. 2749 (XXV), 12 December 1970. 
36 See e.g. Ramesh and Rai, ‘Trading on conservation: A marine protected area as an ecological fix’, 82 Marine 
Policy (2017) 25.  
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ocean floor that now shapes the fate of the ocean and constrains any search for ‘solutions’ to 
problems of inequality and environmental harm.  
III. Legal Developments  
Let us now trace the grab of the ocean floor, starting with the Truman Proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf and culminating with the adoption of the LOSC—the so called ‘constitution 
of the oceans’—which entered into force in 1994 in amended form.37 While necessarily brief, 
this account offers a snapshot of the intersecting interests, events and interventions that fed 
law-making on this issue.    
The Truman Proclamation asserted that the United States ‘regards the natural resources of the 
… continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to [its] coasts … as appertaining to 
the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.’ The claim was limited to the seabed; 
‘[t]he character as high seas of the waters above … [was] in no way thus affected’. Moreover, 
the claim was not of sovereignty over the territory, but of right to its resources. The US stressed 
this distinction in response to the ensuing claims of other states. An accompanying statement 
further indicated that the claim was limited to resources of ‘land … covered by no more than 
100 fathoms (600 feet) of water’.38 
The Proclamation was actuated by the discovery of petroleum and minerals off the US Atlantic 
coast. The text asserted that, in the face of growing worldwide need, jurisdiction over these 
resources was necessary for their ‘conservation and prudent utilization’. And, it was 
‘reasonable and just’ for the US to exercise such jurisdiction. For, a continental shelf could be 
regarded as a natural extension of a coastal state’s territory. There was also often a natural 
connection between territorial and shelf resources, with the latter constituting a seaward 
extension of the former. The coastal state was also the best situated from a practical perspective: 
the effectiveness of use or conservation measures would depend upon its cooperation; and its 
own security interests demanded that it supervise extractive activity proximate to its shores. 
The Proclamation based itself on reason and justice, not law. But it met with no resistance. In 
fact, corresponding claims from other states followed.39 Many of these were far more extensive, 
                                                          
37 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI, 1836 UNTS 3 (1994).  
38 ‘Proclamations concerning United States jurisdiction over Natural Resources in Coastal Areas and the High 
Seas’ (1945) 13 Department of State Bulletin 484 (September 30).  
39 Discussed in Crawford and Viles, International Law on a Given Day, supra note 11, at 87-89.  
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prompting debate over what should be the appropriate legal grounds, and scope, of such claims. 
Per some commentators, the critical factor was the natural appurtenance of the shelf to the 
territory of the coastal state.40 Several states asserted rights on this basis; some going further to 
claim not just jurisdiction over resources but also sovereignty over the terrain, and—applying 
the jusque ad coelum maxim—over the waters and air-space above it.41 Other commentators, 
however, insisted that the essential element was not appurtenance but rather that, via drilling 
and other activities, the US could reasonably claim to have ‘effectively occupied’ the shelf 
(with other states’ lack of protest signifying their acquiescence).42  
Land grab was the concern at the heart of this opposition of views. Commentators relying on 
the effective occupation thesis were concerned about the expansive claims citing natural 
appurtenance that had followed the Truman proclamation and that threatened to place large 
parts of the seabed and waters out of reach of other states. The US itself protested these claims. 
Meanwhile, for those relying on the natural appurtenance thesis, the object was to preserve 
coastal states’ rights over their adjacent continental shelves till such time as they acquired the 
capacity to exploit the resources. They wanted to forestall claims to effective occupation that 
might otherwise be made by more technologically-advanced states.  
Curiously, neither view offered a sufficient account of the extent of the seabed which could be 
claimed. Actual geology did not furnish a limit for claims based on the natural appurtenance 
thesis—Latin American states claiming 200M shelves had much narrower ones in fact. And 
actual activity was not the precondition for the effective occupation thesis: the authors of that 
thesis supported claims based on minimal physical presence in the area, or even—and only—
plausible claim to potential physical activity.43  
The legal basis for claims to the shelf and its extent remained debated in the years that followed, 
as the International Law Commission (ILC) took up the task of drafting relevant rules. The 
1958 CCS, the outcome of its work, expressed a dual formula:  
                                                          
40 E.g. Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty over Submerged Areas’, 27 British Yearbook of International Law (1950) 376, 
at 423ff. 
41 Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Iceland and South Korea: Johnson, 
‘Legal Status of the Sea-bed and Subsoil’, 16 Zeitschrift fur Auslandischer Oeffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 
(1956) 451, 479.   
42 E.g. Waldock, Claims to the Continental Shelf, supra note 18, at 128. ‘Occupation’ (of terrae nullius) and 
‘prescription’ (occupation with others’ acquiescence of lands under individual or communal sovereignty) were 
accepted legal grounds for claims over territory.   
43 Waldock’s arguments are instructive in this regard, excluding only ‘purely paper claims’: ibid., at 141ff.  
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… ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring … to the seabed … adjacent to the coast … 
to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources….44 
While this definition clarified that each coastal state had the right to appurtenant areas up to a 
specified depth,45 the criterion for more extended claims was amazingly vague. The provision 
did not specify that the claimant state should be exploiting the seabed at those greater depths 
already, nor even that it should individually have the capacity to exploit; merely, such capacity 
should exist in some more general sense.46  
Moreover, although the ILC insisted that the word ‘adjacent’ placed a ‘very clear limitation on 
the submarine areas covered … [the] adjacent areas ended where the slope down to the ocean 
bed began, which was not more than 25 miles from the coast’;47 this limitation was 
progressively disregarded. Over the course of the 1960s, interested actors sought extension of 
national jurisdiction over larger and larger areas of the seabed. The US National Petroleum 
Council (USNPC), for instance, saw no need to restrict its activities to the geological 
continental shelf, advising the US government to claim a much greater expanse of territory 
including the shelf, the slope and the continental rise beyond (on which concepts see section 
III).48 As one of the architects of the USNPC’s position noted, the CCS’s exploitability criterion 
provided a feasible legal basis for such assertions.49  
Such assertions also provided the context for Ambassador Pardo’s agenda-defining UN speech 
in November 1967. Pardo highlighted the immense resource potential of the seabed, while 
cautioning that its total grab was already underway. Relying on a reading of the CCS by Shigeru 
Oda (later a World Court judge), he argued that it permitted the whole seabed, shallow and 
deep, to be regarded as the continental shelf.50 Any coastal state, citing exploitability, could 
claim the ocean floor ‘up to the midway point between it and the coastal state opposite’.51 
Technologically-advanced states were already making claims that would result in ‘a 
                                                          
44 Article 1, CCS.  
45 Further clarified in Article 2, CCS.  
46 Young, ‘The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First Impression’, 52 AJIL (1958) 733, at 735.  
47 Statement of ILC Chairman Garcia Amador, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (ILC Ybk) Vol. I 
(1956) 135, cited in Henkin, ‘International Law and “the interests”: the Law of the Seabed’, 63 AJIL (1969) 504, 
at 507.  
48 Henkin, International law and the interests, ibid., at 506.  
49 Finlay, ‘The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: A rejoinder to Louis Henkin’, 64 AJIL (1970) 42. 
50 Oda, ‘Some Observations on the International Law of the Sea’, 11 Japanese Annual of International Law (1967) 
37, 39-40. 
51 UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515, para. 67.  
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competitive scramble … surpassing in magnitude and in its implication last century’s colonial 
scramble for territory in Asia and Africa.’52 Moreover, division of the seabed would be 
followed by claims to the waters above; thus the ocean would be partitioned into ‘national 
lakes’.53 Pardo insisted that it was essential to avoid these grave outcomes. He called upon the 
UN General Assembly to designate the largest possible area of the seabed as the CHM: immune 
from national appropriation and administered by an international body to ensure that its 
resources were exploited for the benefit of all states, especially developing ones.54  
Now, although some actors were indeed claiming extensive zones of national jurisdiction, 
Oda’s view of total partition was a minority one. It was generally understood that there had to 
be some outer limit to a continental shelf; the whole of the seabed could not be characterized 
as such. The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, decided in 1969, reflected this position. The 
World Court indicated ‘natural prolongation of the land’ as the basis for claims.55  While not 
specifying whether the continental slope or rise could be considered part of this natural 
prolongation (as the USNPC had asserted), the Court noted the distinctive nature of ‘ocean 
depths’.56 On their view, as Robert Jennings (another later World Court judge) observed, the 
‘abyssal plain’—i.e. the deep seabed—was ‘certainly beyond national jurisdiction’.57 
Nevertheless, once mainstreamed by Pardo, the fear of a seabed ‘scramble’ took hold amongst 
developing states, forging solidarity and catalysing their support for the CHM idea.  
But this fear also led developing states to summarily dismiss initiatives which might have 
accorded with their interests, such as a proposal by President Nixon. Nixon, acting contrarily 
to the entreaties of the USNPC, proposed that national jurisdiction be limited to depths of 200 
meters (cutting back from the CCS’s exploitability definition). The remainder of the seabed 
would constitute the CHM, divided into an intermediate ‘trusteeship zone’—comprising the 
remaining continental shelf, the slope and the margin—and an ‘international area’ (the deep 
seabed).58 Coastal states would administer resource exploitation in the trusteeship zone, and 
ensure that a portion of the revenue generated was transferred to an international authority, for 
                                                          
52 Ibid., para. 91.  
53 Ibid., para. 72.  
54 UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1516, para. 10.  
55 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands), judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ 
Rep (1969) 3, para. 19.  
56 Ibid., para. 41.  
57 Jennings, ‘The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North Sea Case 
Judgment’, 18 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1969) 819, 827.  
58 Draft UN Convention on the International Seabed Area, 3 August 1970, UN Doc. A/AC.138/25, 9 ILM 1046.  
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distribution to developing states.59 The international authority would also administer resource 
exploitation in the international area.  
This proposal would have brought some fossil fuels within the trusteeship area; and thus, some 
revenue from their exploitation into the common pot. (The regime later agreed places them 
wholly within national jurisdiction).60 Nevertheless, meeting at the inaugural Pacem in 
Maribus conference convened by Pardo in Malta in 1970, developing states expressed 
disapproval. To them, the trusteeship concept carried neo-colonial undertones.61 They argued, 
moreover, that the proposal mainly benefitted the United States, its corporations, and other 
developed states. This was true, but only in part. The proposal did benefit the United States, 
whose eastern continental shelf remains above the 200-meter depth for miles; the depth 
criterion would have brought an area of 845,000 sq. M within its jurisdiction.62 States with 
steeply plunging shelves, including many Latin American ones, would not have equally 
benefitted. Even so, the proposal did not allocate benefits and costs wholly along Global North/ 
South lines: not all developed states were similarly situated, and some developing ones would 
have gained much. Indeed, in the view of the US oil companies, the proposal had been a 
massive—and eccentric—giveaway on part of the US President.  
In fact, the proposal reflected the simultaneous flourishing of a conflicting, Cold War, 
imaginary of the ocean as a site of warfare. In this imaginary, the principle of the freedom of 
the sea was paramount: the United States as well as the erstwhile Soviet Union were concerned 
to ensure that their naval submarines and espionage equipment could operate close to foreign 
coasts. Nixon made his proposal for limiting national jurisdiction in consultation with US 
defence interests: as a CIA-produced ‘scare map’ showed, these interests feared that national 
claims to the seabed would catalyse corollary claims to the waters above, partitioning the ocean 
and hampering navigation.63 Eventually, pressure from the USNPC together with the cool 
international reception of the Nixon proposal led to a change in the US position towards 
favouring extended national jurisdiction. 
                                                          
59 Article 27, Draft UN Convention, ibid.  
60 Art 82, LOSC provides for the sharing of revenue from a small part of the area under national jurisdiction.   
61 FCO 76/161, supra note 21.  
62 Payne, ‘Transnational Petroleum Companies and New Developments in Sea Law’, 20 Howard Law Journal 
(1977) 444. 
63 Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean, supra note 5, at 175. Matthew Craven’s contribution to this 
symposium traces the simultaneous flourishing of two imaginaries of outer space.  
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The above episode reveals several aspects of international law-making at the time: The United 
States’ inconsistent positions were the result of internal squabbles between its defence and 
resource interests. Meanwhile, several factors accounted for the position taken by developing 
states: group solidarity as well as shrewd appreciation of the importance of a common stance; 
resentment at the neo-colonial undertones of a suggested resource allocation scheme as well as 
suspicion that it was an attempt to deflect the CHM principle. These factors continued to guide 
developing states during the LOSC negotiations. For instance, it was noted that states like 
Tanzania and Sri Lanka changed their initial positions on the criteria for delimitation of the 
continental shelf, and India even decided to act against its own interest, out of solidarity with 
other developing states: all came to support the 200M limit favoured by Latin American 
states.64 Moreover—in a telling illustration of the role that suspicion played—developing states 
refused to accept the downward-revised estimates of the deep seabed’s mineral wealth and of 
available mining technology that emerged in the later years. Markus Schmidt recalls, 
‘[d]elegates who tried to inject a note of caution into the debates were told by others that all 
the optimistic figures were in print, which seemed to imply that they had to be correct.’65 Thus, 
they continued to participate vigorously in the undoubtedly financially burdensome 
negotiations, and to push for an elaborate CHM regime. 
While Pardo’s CHM idea was popular as a means of facilitating distribution of the benefits of 
seabed resources alongside their exploitation, it was also in tension with many coastal states’ 
(including developing states’) interests in extending national jurisdiction over large swathes of 
the seabed and waters. Thus in 1970, when the UN General Assembly declared the 
‘international’ seabed as the CHM, it could not indicate its precise boundaries; only that it lay 
‘beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the precise limits of which are yet to be 
determined.’66 The Assembly looked to an international conference to identify a solution that 
would satisfy both those interested in extended national jurisdiction and those interested in 
maximising the international resource base.  
The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) convened in 1973 as a 
mammoth gathering of states, many newly independent. It was, in design, a departure from the 
usual format of international law-making, where a small expert body—like the ILC—was 
                                                          
64 Per correspondence between J. Blair (Shell) and D. A. Campbell (Foreign Office) (1971), in FCO 76/328, UK 
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delegated the task of formulating appropriate provisions. Rather, all states were to participate 
in open negotiations.67 The Conference addressed the conundrum of extended national 
jurisdiction or large international resource-base by splitting the question between different 
committees: one was tasked with identifying the limits of national jurisdiction, another with 
formulating an international regime based on the CHM principle.  
After years of (tedious and repetitive) debate, the Conference finally agreed on a distance 
criterion to delimit zones of national jurisdiction. Thus, under the LOSC, 200M of the seabed, 
measured from a coastal baseline is denoted as the ‘continental shelf’—regardless of its depth; 
and regardless also of whether there is a shelf at all in geological terms. But geology is not 
immaterial, for the treaty permits a further extension of national jurisdiction if the physical 
shelf, slope, or relevant portion of continental rise, continue beyond 200M. In consultation with 
a ‘Commission on Continental Shelf Limits’, coastal states may thus claim jurisdiction over 
terrain up to 350M from the coast, or 100M from a 2500-meter depth line.68 Here, they have 
the same rights to extract (or license extraction of) minerals and other non-living resources, 
and sedentary living organisms as they do in the 200M zone, but must transfer a portion of the 
revenue to the ISA.69 The LOSC also requires them to adopt measures to limit pollution of the 
marine environment due to extractive activities in either zone.70  
As mentioned earlier, the ISA is further tasked with administering access to, and extraction of, 
the mineral resources of the international area of the seabed. Exploration and exploitation 
activities cannot take place without an ISA license—at least as far as member states to the 
LOSC are concerned; the United States’ non-party status and its considerable presence in 
resource rich areas of the international seabed complicates matters.71 The ISA grants its 
licenses upon the fulfilment of certain conditions: some concerned with protecting the marine 
environment, others oriented towards redistribution of the benefits from seabed mining to 
developing states.72 Thus, as in the case of the international law on the continental shelf, the 
                                                          
67 The experience of the negotiations was rather the opposite—secret meetings, closed-door bargains, and 
abounding fears of conspiracy.  
68 Article 76, LOSC. 
69 Article 82, LOSC.  
70 Article 208, LOSC.  
71 The Clarion-Clipperton zone in the Pacific Ocean is one example: for an account of the contestations over 
mining sites in this zone, see S. Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of 
International Law (2014), at 161-187. At present, US claims are accorded recognition on a bilateral level by most 
other states with mining interests in the zone.  
72 The conditions governing the grant of exploration licenses are indicated in the regulations issued by the ISA 
vis-à-vis various types of mineral deposits: e.g. Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules in the Area, adopted 2000 (amended 2013), annex, ISBA Doc. ISBA/ 19/ C/ 17 (22 July 2013). The ISA 
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regime for the deep seabed recognises and addresses some of the challenges that might arise 
vis-à-vis the extraction of the seabed’s resources. I will return to this point in Section IV.  
IV. Key grounds  
This section will tease out two key grounds which facilitated the legal developments described 
above: the geography of the ocean floor, and the economic value of its resources. I will show 
that while both had some basis in fact, they were also reified by law, together reconstituting 
ocean space into a distinctive legal imaginary.  
A. Ocean floor geography  
Let me begin with the continental shelf. A consistent line of argument for extending national 
jurisdiction over the seabed stressed the physical connection between the shelf and coastal 
territory. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the World Court concluded that ‘the rights 
of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue 
of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it ...’73 The LOSC similarly includes the 
idea of ‘natural prolongation of … land territory’ in the definition of the continental shelf.74 It 
also clarifies that the coastal state’s rights over the shelf ‘do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation.’75  
The description of the shelf as a natural prolongation of land territory does have some basis in 
fact. The law of the sea uses the term ‘shelf’ to connote the entire ‘continental margin’, which 
includes: the geological continental shelf, a relatively shallow and gently declining submarine 
ledge attached to the coast of all states, though to greater or lesser extents; the continental slope, 
a steeply declining terrain beyond the geological shelf; and the continental rise, a gentler 
gradient found at the bottom of the slope. This cumulative margin can be considered a 
prolongation of land in the sense that it is formed of the same—‘continental’—crust as land. 
In contrast the deep sea floor is formed of different—‘oceanic’—crust. 
                                                          
has not yet issued exploitation licenses; it is currently drafting regulations to that end: see Draft Regulations on 
the Exploitation of Minerals in the Area, ISBA Doc. ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3* (8 August 2017).  
73 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 55, para. 19  
74 Article 76(1), LOSC.  
75 Article 77(3), LOSC.  
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Yet the law, although invoking the idea of prolongation, does not quite follow the facts of 
continental shelf geography: the shelf may not be a prolongation, or not necessarily in any 
smooth way. Seafloor topography is complex, shifting, and still lacking detailed mapping; but 
it is evident that shelves may be heavily fractured and discontinuous.76 More importantly, the 
law does not follow the facts in what it identifies as the continental shelf. The criterion used 
for delimiting the shelf from the deep seabed is distance: in the usual case, 200M of the seafloor 
measured from a baseline. Yet, in several instances not only is the geological shelf exceeded 
at that distance, but also the entire continental margin.77 This is the case for 34 states.78 Included 
in their shelf, then, is also some part of the deep sea-floor. ‘Natural prolongation’ evidently 
does not delimit national jurisdiction, although it provides a basis for claims beyond 200M.  
In the early years of shelf claims, assertions of natural appurtenance had proceeded in relative 
ignorance of the shelf’s actual geology. This state-of-the-field review from 1956 is illustrative:  
Most geologists, apparently, consider the continents, the continental shelves and the 
sea-bed and subsoil lying beneath the deep oceans to be constituted fundamentally of 
the same material. But there are some theories according to which the continents and 
the continental shelves are made up of material different from that which constitutes 
the sea-bed and subsoil lying beneath the deep oceans. These theories do not appear to 
be generally accepted, but, even if they were, it is doubtful what practical or juridical 
conclusions, if any, should be drawn from them. It is not at all likely that any possible 
difference in the composition of the continental masses as compared with the ocean 
floor can compare in significance with the distinction, obvious to the layman, between 
land on the one hand and water on the other hand.79  
Not only does this passage assert the uniform composition of continental and oceanic crusts (in 
which mistake international lawyers would gradually correct themselves); it also rejects that a 
geological distinction between them could provide the decisive basis for delimitation of the 
shelf. Indeed—as we might remind ourselves—the CCS, adopted in 1958, instead stressed 
                                                          
76 A good example is the Monterey canyon, off the coast of California, which serves as a fertile research site for 
the Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute: on this canyon and the institute, see S. Helmreich, Alien Ocean 
(2009). 
77 The subsumption of the whole continental margin under the rules fostering claims to the shelf did not pass 
without criticism: Friedman, ‘Selden Redivivus - Towards a Partition of the Seas?’, 65 AJIL (1971) 757. It is then 
even more of a stark exaggeration to place the deep seabed under national jurisdiction under the definition that it 
is the continental shelf.  
78 P. Cook and C. Carleton (eds.), Continental Shelf Limits: The Legal and Scientific Interface (2000), at 268.  
79 Johnson, Legal Status of the Seabed, supra note 41, at 461.  
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‘exploitability’ as the relevant criterion. Despite the World Court’s emphasis, the soon-
following LOSC negotiations too did not place sole significance upon ‘natural prolongation’ 
as the basis for delimiting the continental shelf: as noted above, many factors shaped the 
positions taken by states on that issue.80 Of course, amongst these, one important factor, 
shaping the concern of bodies such as the USNPC to ensure that the definition of the shelf 
would encompass the entire continental margin, was oil—found at greater and greater depths 
in the continental crust, but not in the oceanic crust.  
Why then does the law of the sea invoke natural prolongation in explaining the concept of the 
shelf? One reason may be that, as mentioned earlier, those who articulated it as the basis for 
claims regarded the alternative—effective occupation—as raising the threat of extensive claims 
by states commanding advanced technology. While the natural appurtenance thesis (which 
underpinned arguments of natural prolongation) also had attendant dangers in the form of 
creeping claims to the waters as well as the seabed, these were more easily resolved. For 
creeping claims were simply forestalled by the law, which soon clarified that rights over the 
seabed would not generate corresponding claims over the above waters. Recollect that the 
Truman Proclamation had purported to leave unaffected the status of the waters above. 
Thereafter, the 1958 CCS also did not cover the waters; those were confirmed as remaining 
under the freedom of the seas.81 And the LOSC too maintains separate regimes for the shelf, 
deep seabed, and various sections of the waters.  
In fact, the LOSC underlines the separate regimes for the seabed and seawaters in a particularly 
noteworthy way. On the one hand, it permits states to claim up to 200M of the waters and 
seabed as their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This stretch of water and bed maps exactly 
on to a normal length continental shelf, and would suggest that for that stretch the bed/waters 
distinction might be immaterial. On the other hand, the LOSC limits the given rules for the use 
of the EEZ to the waters and their resources; the seabed and its resources remain subject to the 
continental shelf regime.82 The LOSC expressly excludes application of the EEZ provisions to 
them.83 That is, in short, according to the LOSC, the seabed up to 200M may be both the 
continental shelf and the EEZ of a state; but is governed solely as the former. Furthermore, 
                                                          
80 See text accompanying note 63. Records from UNCLOS III and the preceding UN Seabed Committee reveal a 
complex negotiating history in which states’ positions were shaped by many factors: good accounts include 
Anand, Legal Regime of the Seabed, supra note 19; S. Oda, The Law of the Sea in Our Time vols. 1 and 2 (1977). 
81 Art 3, CCS.  
82 The EEZ regime is set out in Arts 55-75, LOSC; the continental shelf regime in Arts 76-85.   
83 See Arts 56(3), 68, LOSC.  
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unlike in the case of the continental shelf, a state must expressly proclaim an EEZ.84 Absent 
such a proclamation, the waters beyond the territorial seas are treated as the high seas; though 
the bed remains the continental shelf.  
Indeed, and contrary to fears of creeping jurisdiction that had arisen, the idea of natural 
prolongation assists this different treatment of the seabed and waters. It allows jurisdictional 
claims to be represented as a reclamation of land (and land alone), rather than an enclosure of 
the sea, suggesting by implication that no restrictions need be made to the well-established 
principle of the freedom of the seas. In fact, in the early years of shelf claims, legal 
commentators had stressed the physical separation of land and water on such arguments as that 
an ‘infinitely thin’ membrane divided the subsoil of the seabed and the water column, and 
permitted the removal of resources which were then wholly those of the bed, not of the sea.85  
(Some further insisted that, as a corollary, the removal of these resources could only be via 
operations ‘begun on the coast … and … carried beneath the high seas wholly underground.’86) 
More practically-minded lawyers, however, made clear that it was simply more advantageous 
to embrace the separability of land and sea. Humphrey Waldock—later an ILC member and 
then a World Court judge—observed that treating the seabed as part of the sea would impede 
exclusive occupation for extended periods, and consequently impede its exploitation. On the 
other hand, not treating the seabed as part of the sea would mean that the principle of the 
freedom of the seas need not apply, and the seabed could be occupied for the periods necessary 
for its exploitation. Even where exploitation activities entailed some extrusions into the sea—
mining platforms for instance—these could be more easily reconciled with the principle of 
freedom so long as states made the necessary efforts to ensure that they did not obstruct other 
uses of the sea, such as fishing, navigation and laying of cables.87  Waldock described the 
perceptions of the seabed as either a part of the sea, or as a separate occupiable terrain, as 
evenly-weighted in juristic terms, and asserted that it was ‘legitimate to prefer that which 
admits of some exploitation of valuable resources’.88  
                                                          
84 Interestingly, the LOSC does not expressly spell out this proclamation requirement; on the other hand, it 
includes no language equivalent to Art 77(3), LOSC. In practice, states have acquired EEZs by proclamation: the 
UK only acquired its EEZ in 2014, by way of the Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013, SI 2013/3161.   
85 See Johnson, Legal Status of the Seabed, supra note 41, at 462-463.  
86 Waldock, Claims to the Continental Shelf, supra note 18, at 117 (citing Gilbert Gidel, Pearce Higgins and John 
Colombos).    
87 Ibid., 137.  
88 Ibid., 136.  
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Later, Pardo too, in making his plea for the CHM, specifically restricted its application to the 
seabed. This, of course, had nothing to do with enabling sovereignty claims, but, as with the 
regime of the continental shelf, was intended to avoid entanglement with the principle of the 
freedom of the seas. Pardo thus acted contrary to some civil society initiatives to have the high 
seas as well as the international seabed designated as the CHM: The Commission to Study the 
Organisation of Peace and the World Peace Through Law Conference had submitted draft 
resolutions to that effect to the UN Secretary General just days after Malta requested a slot for 
Pardo’s speech.89 As Pardo later recalled, he limited his proposal to avoid ‘the suspicion and 
opposition’ that would follow if he was seen by major powers to be replacing the well-
established principle of freedom with the CHM principle. Embracing the separability of bed 
and waters was a tactical move, for the seabed ‘until then had aroused little interest in 
international lawyers and governments’.90 This separability was quickly espoused. Even as it 
was agreed that negotiations over a new treaty should encompass all ocean space, and even as 
the extent of the international seabed area was hotly debated, it remained clear that the CHM 
principle would not extend to the waters.  
The LOSC, therefore, consolidates the formal separation of the seabed from the waters. It 
further seeks to pre-empt complications arising from this separation, by allocating the ocean’s 
living and non-living ‘resources’91 to one or the other regime; although the rules by which it 
does so are vague and incoherent. Thus, alongside mineral and petroleum deposits, ‘sedentary’ 
living resources are placed within the continental shelf regime. These are explained to be 
organisms either immobile on or under the seabed, or unable to move except in constant 
physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.92 They include bottom-dwelling creatures such 
as clams, oysters, sponges and corals; although such creatures live in the water as much as they 
do on the bed. Even more controversially, the regime is applied to crustaceans, such as shrimps, 
prawns, lobsters, and crabs—although these can swim.93 Meanwhile, other bottom-dwelling 
                                                          
89 Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, Draft Resolution and Working Paper, 21 August 1967, S-
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90 Pardo, ‘The Origins of the 1967 Maltese Initiative’ 9 International Insights (1993) 65, at 66-67. 
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fish, or fish that use the seabed as breeding grounds, are placed within the regimes pertaining 
to the waters (i.e. the EEZ, or high seas).  
With respect to the deep ocean, polymetallic nodules—that form by the accretion of minerals 
around such fragments as shark teeth or clam shells—are placed within the CHM regime. So 
are other mineral resources, whether solid, liquid or gaseous.94 However, all living resources—
no distinction here between sedentary and non-sedentary organisms—are excluded from the 
CHM regime; they are allocated to the high seas regime. That is, they remain governed by the 
principle of freedom of use, as qualified by a patchwork of rules aimed at their conservation.95  
Apart from incoherence, such jurisdictional allocations also proceed in disregard of complex 
and symbiotic ecosystems within which such resources, both living and non-living, develop. 
This is perhaps most clearly seen in the example of hydrothermal chimneys, such as those of 
the ‘Lost City’ of the mid-Atlantic.96 Chimneys develop from vents formed at sites of tectonic 
activity and can grow up to 60m in height. They release mineral-rich fluids (making vent sites 
attractive from a mining perspective), which provide a fertile breeding ground for chemical-
harvesting, or ‘chemosynthetic’ microbes.97 These microbes are the starting point of the ‘dark’ 
food chain (as distinguished from the sunlight-harvesting or ‘photosynthetic’ food chain that 
surface organisms, including us human beings are part of).98 They have been speculated upon 
as the original life forms on Earth. Speaking not at all to the particular features of such sites, 
the law of the sea effectively places the chimney structures and their surrounding mineral 
concentrations under the seabed regimes of continental shelf, or CHM (depending on location); 
while the microbes and other marine life gathered at, even clinging to, these chimneys fall 
within the high seas regime. This aids mining activity: the ISA recently granted Poland a 
license to explore an area including the Lost City as a possible mining site, raising alarm 
amongst scientists of the possible threat of destruction that now faces its ecosystem.99   
                                                          
94 Art 133, LOSC.  
95 A new comprehensive treaty on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction 
is being negotiated under the auspices of the UN; it will be adopted as an instrument under the LOSC (like the 
Agreement on Part XI). See GA Res. 69/292 (19 June 2015) and GA Res. 72/249 (19 January 2018).   
96 See Kelley et al., ‘An off-axis hydrothermal vent field near the Mid-Atlantic Ridge at 30° N’, 412 Nature 
(2001) 145.  
97 These are also now the subject of industrial interest: see e.g. Broad, The Universe Below, supra note 6, at 276-
284.  
98 Ibid., at 108-109 
99 See e.g. Embury-Dennis, ‘Deep sea mining could destroy possible source of life on earth, warn scientists’, The 
Independent, 6 March 2018.   
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The point I have tried to make in this subsection is that although the law of the sea invokes the 
idea of the ocean’s ‘natural’ geography as informing its division into national and international 
areas and into land and water regimes, the legal zones neither fully correspond to this natural 
geography nor comprehend the ecological connections that make the divisions problematic. 
Nevertheless, it is very easy to understand why we have these divisions: They reconcile the 
various interests of states and corporations in the ocean—protecting the freedom of use for 
navigation and (high seas) fisheries, while facilitating mining activities on the seabed. In the 
following sub-section, then, I examine some factors that placed seabed mining at the heart of 
the law’s development.  
B. Seabed resources  
Thus far, the argument has taken the quest for seabed resources as the given factor determining 
the grab of the ocean floor, and this subsection will reinforce that. But, alongside, it will also 
scrutinize this quest for resources, to highlight how seabed resources were elevated into the 
deciding factor in constructing our present-day imaginary of the ocean. For, here too we have 
a story of reification: the seabed, undeniably, contains both oil and minerals, but their 
importance, and value, were consolidated through law.   
Let us, again, trace this first with respect to the regime for the continental shelf. There, on the 
one hand, the announcement of new legal rules cited the essential need to secure these 
resources: for instance, the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf noted the growing 
worldwide demand for petroleum. On the other hand, it was a stream of legal opinions that not 
only confirmed that this was an increasingly valuable resource, but also cemented the enclosure 
approach announced by the Proclamation.  
Thus, Cecil Hurst, a former World Court president, told the Grotius Society that ‘international 
lawyers must approach this subject … on a realistic basis. It is useless to underestimate the 
need for petroleum in the modern world’.100 International law (and lawyers) had a clear purpose 
in the face of this need: to overcome the difficulties in exploitation of the resource, adjusting 
‘old ideas about international law [which] may be found to be inadequate, or even 
unsatisfactory, in the light of modern requirements.’101 Other lawyers also hastened to advocate 
similar views: the report of the ILC to the UN General Assembly on its work in 1950 records 
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the common sense of the Commission that ‘[l]egal concepts should not impede’ the exploitation 
of continental shelf resources.102  
The idea to be adjusted was of course the freedom of the seas. Though it had well served 
overseas commerce and fisheries, this freedom was not suited to the extraction of petroleum, 
or other non-renewable resources that require heavy and long-term investment into specific 
extraction sites. To make such investment, corporations needed assured tenure over these sites; 
correspondingly, states sought the authority to issue exclusive mining licenses. And hence the 
claims of national jurisdiction.  
While I do not question the allure of oil in this period,103 enclosure within national jurisdiction 
was not the only basis on which the extraction of petroleum and natural resources could have 
proceeded. Waldock, publishing in 1950, discussed other possibilities, including that oil 
exploitation could take place under international regulation. He noted that  
An economic argument can be made for such a solution because many States have no 
oil at all and the practical result of the continental shelf doctrine will be to place most 
of the remaining oil resources of the world which are to be found under the sea, in the 
hands of the States which already control oil resources under dry land.104  
In other words, international regulation would be, in distributive terms, a superior economic 
solution. Nevertheless, it was not one that Waldock thought international lawyers could bring 
about: ‘in the present condition of the United Nations a multilateral agreement for international 
regulation of exploitation does not seem to be feasible.’105  Thus, as noted earlier, he counselled 
embrace of the separability thesis, which would allow the seabed to be excluded from the 
purview of the principle of freedom, and thus amenable to national enclosure.  
Waldock here followed other members of the ‘invisible college’.106 Publishing in the same 
year, his predecessor on the ILC and the World Court, Hersch Lauterpacht, also counselled a 
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pragmatic approach. Lauterpacht argued that it was ‘unlikely that any purely doctrinal 
opposition of lawyers—even if otherwise well founded—would be able to stem the hitherto 
uniform progress of claims and developments, which are not intrinsically unreasonable, in the 
matter of the “continental shelf”.’107 A rigid approach, which insisted upon the principle of the 
freedom of the seas, could foster disregard for that principle by states anxious to commence 
exploitation. However, if international lawyers adopted a more flexible approach, they might 
succeed in ‘containing [shelf-related claims and] developments within the channels of 
moderation and order.’108  
Lauterpacht’s writings are especially illuminating of the concerns that informed the attitudes 
of many (especially, but not only) British lawyers in the post-War era. The writings reflect a 
common sense of international law as a project as well as a practice; the goal of the project 
being to build respect for (the rule of) international law. This could not be achieved on the 
assertion of doctrinal verities, but rather by demonstrating the law’s adaptability to new 
conditions. Such demonstration—so the reasoning appeared to go—would foster engagement 
with and through law, rather than some other medium, permitting in turn the work of ‘gentle 
civilising’ to continue.109  And, of course, international law did facilitate order with regard to 
states’ continental shelf claims: it established a definition to delimit these claims, and also 
provided the rules and mechanisms to resolve competing claims.  
DHN Johnson, publishing a state of the field essay on the continental shelf in 1956, lauded the 
attitude of his colleagues in international law as ‘commendably quick’ and ‘remarkably 
constructive’.110 ‘Writers of very different outlooks and doctrinal positions’, he noted, ‘have 
hastened to give the assurance that no rules of international law stand between the world and 
the fulfilment of its needs.’111 Johnson noted the critiques that had been made of the 
international law of the era before the first world war, i.e., that ‘it possessed an excessively 
formal and static character’, due to ‘the tendency of the international lawyers of the time to 
attach too much importance to the formal processes of the elaboration of the law and too little 
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to the ethical, political and social factors underlying the law.’112 But this could not be said of 
‘modern international law’:    
The … articles of Sir Cecil Hurst and Professor Lauterpacht … are proof of the concern 
of leading international lawyers of the present time that, whatever the defects of modern 
international law, this particular charge shall not be levelled against it. These … happen 
to be … the works of English writers. But international lawyers the world over have 
shown the same concern…113  
A certain pragmatism—laced with anxiety about what would otherwise be the fate of 
international law—thus informed the responses of international lawyers to the events triggered 
by the Truman Proclamation. It is striking to see how quickly, acting on this basis, they 
hypostatized the possibilities of oil extraction into given realities and applicable rules. Their 
intermediation contributed to deflecting both normative questions (what principles should 
underpin the law of the sea) and distributional ones (in whose interests should the ocean be 
used) on to the simpler terrain of technical detail (how much area was ‘exploitable’).114 While 
states may have led the process of making shelf claims, lawyers did much of the work of 
normalizing the model—exclusive national jurisdiction for sake of effective exploitation—
which has characterised the law.  
Turning now to the deep seabed, we see again the hypostatization of vague future possibilities 
of seabed mining into current urgency to design a legal regime. The difference is that the 
exaggeration here extended to the economic value of the resources, and the motivations at play 
were even more complicated than securing the place of international law. Pardo’s intervention, 
pivotal in placing the deep seabed on the UN’s law-making agenda, had overstated the promise 
of seabed minerals. He had relied on a scientific study, but had omitted to mention that study’s 
caution that only a fraction of the estimated wealth of the deep seabed would prove economic 
to mine. Instead, he described that study as offering a ‘conservative’ estimate. Pardo had also 
raised the spectre of a scramble for the ocean floor, tapping into the fresh memories of the 
newly independent states assembled to hear his speech. Ironically, he had used the fear as the 
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basis for a proposal that would secure developed states’ right to rule the seabed by way of a 
special agency, arguing against oversight of seabed mining by a body like the UN General 
Assembly which accorded equal voting power to all states.115  
None of this should be taken to suggest that Pardo’s intervention deserves only criticism: in 
fact, it must be accorded credit both for highlighting the threats, including environmental, 
facing the ocean;116 and for emphasizing the redistribution of the benefits of seabed resources. 
These were important points to make, particularly together.117 Nevertheless, the intervention 
played a key role in promoting a view of the deep seabed as, foremost, a mining site. As 
discussed elsewhere, the factors that drove Pardo to make his proposal were complex, having 
to do as much—or more—with enhancing Malta’s international standing.118 
Even more complex, however, were the factors that kept the seabed mining issue at the 
forefront of the LOSC negotiations. For in fact, it need not have maintained its prominence: 
The expectation of demand for seabed minerals had peaked in the 1960s, and then declined 
with the discovery of new land deposits. There were also evident doubts about the availability 
of suitable mining technology. Yet the regime-making proceeded regardless of these facts, 
taking years and consuming significant financial and human resources of all states, especially 
developing ones. One explanation for this is that the seabed became one of the key arenas for 
the contest over the new international economic order (NIEO), in which the developing states 
were keen to reorient the fundamental principles governing international relations, even 
irrespective of actual economic gains.119 This explanation is certainly part of the story, but 
becomes problematic when extended to the claim that developing states were solely engaged 
in the pursuit of ideological dividends regardless of practicalities. For they had been given 
reasons to maintain belief in the relatively bright prospects of seabed mining. They saw reports 
about major industrial ventures, not least the false CIA story.120 They were also given 
misinformation: even as developed states privately acknowledged that a very few mining sites 
would meet even future mineral demands (giving first movers an insurmountable advantage) 
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and high production costs would leave ‘insignificant’ funds for redistribution, they hesitated to 
reveal this to developing states,121 perhaps fearing that it would strengthen those states’ 
preference that mining be carried out exclusively by an ISA organ. Indeed, Henry Kissinger 
canvassed a ‘parallel’ system—in which both corporations and an ISA organ could conduct 
mining—on the assertion that there were ‘more than 100 valuable sites on which operations 
could be conducted at present’.122 Possibly, like developing states, developed states had 
multiple motives: to keep developing states invested in the seabed negotiations so that 
concessions in this respect could be traded off against other NIEO demands; but also to forestall 
a legal framework that might be too constraining in the future. Maintaining the stance that 
mining was a sufficiently economic activity promoted both ends.  
In any event, the regime set out in the LOSC as adopted in 1982 does not convey the sense that 
seabed mining was regarded as an activity of doubtful promise. The provisions of ‘Part XI’—
concerned with the deep seabed—were more detailed than those relating to any other part or 
use of the ocean. They designated the deep seabed and its resources as the CHM and 
emphasized the sharing of benefits.123 While providing for a parallel system,124 they also 
entailed the provision of various forms of assistance to the ISA mining organ and developing 
states to enable them too to engage in mining.125 They further set out production quotas to 
prevent a glut on the market, and measures for compensating developing land-based producer 
states suffering loss of earnings due to seabed mining.126 Largely unwelcome to developed 
states—many refused to sign the treaty—most measures of assistance and compensation were 
written out of the amended regime that entered into force in 1994.127 Those amendments, 
seeking to base the mining regime squarely on commercial (rather than redistributive) 
principles, consolidated the extractive imaginary put in place by the 1982 regime.  
V. Legal Imaginary of the Seabed  
Viewed today from a legal perspective the seabed is, firstly, divided into zones—one placed 
under the national jurisdiction of states, the other placed under the ISA.128 Secondly, it is 
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juridically separated from the water column above; this is true even for the continental shelves 
encapsulated within proclaimed EEZs. Thirdly, its contents are selectively visibilized—and as 
resources. Legal rights to the continental shelf include rights to non-living resources and 
sedentary species, but not other bottom-dwelling ones. Legal rights to the deep seabed include 
rights to non-living resources; the deep seabed’s marine life is not comprehended within the 
CHM regime. These classifications make it possible to view the seabed as primarily a mining 
site. Obviously, the law recognises that the seabed can be put to other uses: for laying cables 
and pipelines, conducting scientific research, disposing wastes, and constructing artificial 
islands and other installations. It provides for these uses to be accommodated alongside mining 
activities;129 in any event they reinforce, not dilute, the conclusion that the law turns the seabed 
over to the extractive interests of states and corporations. This is regardless of the specific 
jurisdictional allocation—whether to states or the ISA; both parts of the seabed must be 
recognised as grabbed.  
Let me return to one of the challenges made to this representation of the law: that it is reductive 
to view all of the seabed as grabbed, for that elides the differences between regimes; some are 
more socially inclusive and ecologically sensitive than others. The CHM regime for instance 
requires the taking of measures for effective protection of the marine environment, and enjoins 
the ISA to adopt relevant rules, regulations and procedures to this end.130 The ISA has been 
commendably active on this front, adopting regulations and recommendations in accordance 
with the state-of-the-art in environmental governance.131 Nevertheless, ameliorative efforts do 
not challenge the view of the ocean floor as principally a site of commercial mining activity, 
they may even reinforce it by operating as an ‘ecological fix’;132 the possibility of ‘better’ 
exploitation forestalling the question as to whether the seabed should be mined at all. This is a 
question that deserves greater prominence, with scientists pointing out the serious harms, 
including a net loss of marine biodiversity, which may be caused by seabed mining.133 Yet, it 
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is not a question that the ISA was set up to ask, or will be encouraged to ask by states.134 Of 
course we cannot prejudge its work: it may be that the ISA would block exploitation out of 
concern for the marine ecology. Thus far, however, its work has included the grant of several 
exploration licenses including for sites of great ecological significance, like the Lost City.135 
Similar points may be made about the provisions relating to the benefit of mankind. In the 
discussions of the 1950s and 60s, it was taken for granted that extracting seabed resources will 
be for the benefit of mankind. Redistribution was in fact regarded as only one possible mode 
by which to spread the benefit; other models assumed that the economic growth catalysed by 
these new resources was a benefit in itself—we might recall that ILC discussions on the 
continental shelf also spoke of the benefit of mankind, without linking the extension of national 
jurisdiction to any sharing of the resources or the revenue.136 The benefit read in here was 
supply security—these seabed resources alleviated the scarcity of land resources.137 However, 
by the time of the LOSC negotiations, the demand for deep seabed minerals had declined; and 
there was concern amongst land-based producers of the loss of their own mining revenue. At 
this time then, the benefit had to be recast: redistribution, the facilitation of developing states’ 
entry into the seabed mining industry, and the argument that seabed mining entailed fewer 
adverse environmental implications than mining on land.  But these ‘benefits’ too came into 
doubt. As mentioned earlier, it turned out that developed states had privately acknowledged 
that there would not be much profit to redistribute. The subsidies for developing states were 
also written out of the regime by way of the 1994 Agreement.138 The claim of fewer ecological 
implications lacks scientific validation.  
The key point here is that we need more critical inquiry into the idea of ‘benefit of mankind’, 
and whether, why and how it may be advanced by seabed mining.139 Meanwhile, it is crucial 
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to recognise that notions of ‘better’ exploitation, or of (vaguely conceived) ‘benefits to 
mankind’—although manifesting as real differences between various seabed regimes—do not 
subvert the current legal imaginary in which the seabed serves the extractive interests of some 
states and corporations. 
New designs for the use of the ocean, such as the Ocean Spiral project, which I mentioned at 
the outset, build on that imaginary, for a further grab of the seabed. That project too is explained 
in terms of benefits to humankind; the Shimizu Corporation explains—in words that recall 
earlier ocean fantasies—that the project ‘seeks to harness the power of the deep sea to renew 
the earth, with a deep sea city of the future serving as a base camp’.140 As presented by the 
corporation, the Ocean Spiral will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will provide a new ‘city’ for 
up to 5000 inhabitants that will be ‘safer’, ‘more comfortable’ and healthier, with ‘higher 
concentrations of oxygen’ than cities on land.141 Secondly, it will cater to global needs in five 
areas—food security; energy security via conversion of the ocean’s thermal energy (although 
the plan speaks only of energy self-sufficiency for the project); water, via desalination of 
seawater (again, however self-sufficiency is presented as the goal); reducing carbon dioxide 
levels (nothing is indicated beyond the claim that the project will put carbon dioxide ‘to use’), 
and extraction of natural resources.142 The plan is claimed to ‘[b]reak[] free from past patterns 
of land development, which have focused mainly on efficiency’; rather, it will ‘promote true 
sustainability while maximizing use of the deep sea’s resources’.143 It is not my purpose here 
to assess whether the project might meet its stated goals. Rather, I highlight the goals so that 
we might note their familiar structure: multiple rewards (new lifestyle, unlimited resources) for 
a few, leavened by the promise of some generically stated benefits for all. For those who would 
not qualify for the new weather-event-proof small gated communities of the Ocean Spiral(s) 
and who do not profit from its extractive activities, the benefits—as stated in the project 
materials—would appear to be two: the opportunity to buy its ‘branded seafood’;144 and the 
opportunity to buy other products manufactured from its exploitation of seabed resources.  
The project represents an escalated grab of the ocean in its legal aspects as well. The prospectus 
announces that its ‘large-scale concept seeks to take advantage of the limitless possibilities of 
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the deep sea by linking together vertically the air, sea surface, deep sea, and sea floor.’145 This 
of course raises questions about where the company seeks to build these Ocean Spirals. To the 
extent that its activities are to be located within the EEZs of states they are at least within the 
licensing power of individual states, although we might note that in scale and scope the 
proposed structures represent a greater curtailment of the freedom of navigation. Moreover, 
they probably also better express the interconnected ‘land’ and ‘sea’ ecosystems of the zone. 
But, the plans as set out in the prospectus indicate that the abyssal plain is the preferred siting-
ground for these spirals.146 In that case, outside of the situations where the plain is legally 
within the 200M distance limit from the coasts, and thus within national jurisdiction, the Ocean 
Spiral(s) will be built on the international seabed area. And that—effectively the building of 
settlements on the seabed—represents an enclosure of a different kind from the grant of mining 
licenses. Will the ISA claim the authority to grant permission for such construction? What 
about the fact that these structures will project all the way to the surface from the depths, i.e. 
reside in the sea? For this, it is possible that the corporation might rely upon a sponsoring state’s 
high seas freedom to build artificial islands; which may be built so long as reasonable regard 
is maintained for other users of the high seas.147 But consider the implications: perhaps a single 
structure might pass, but the network of structures proposed by the corporation,148 effectively 
enclosing a large part of the high seas, surely would need more of a legal basis than the principle 
of freedom (at least if the principle is not to be reduced entirely to Orwellian double-speak). 
And so, will we see a further development of the law permitting the creation of luxury living 
spaces for some on the argument that they also generate some benefits for many? And, will it 
again be the lawyers that lead the development of this law, reifying the distant possibilities of 
what such a project might achieve into given realities?  
These questions are asked by reference to the Ocean Spiral project, but not as particular to it. 
That project may never reach the point of practical implementation, but its design represents 
the new forms in which the grab of the ocean continues. These forms grow more sophisticated, 
co-opting arguments of ecological and social justice, as much as arguments of growth and 
profit. They ask more and more of the ocean, finding new ways of extracting value from it. 
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And they ask more and more of international law, to provide, as it has before, the conditions 
that facilitate these new forms of exploitation.  
VI. Conclusion 
How, then, will the law respond? The effort in this article has been to show that the current law 
of the sea owes both to contingency and false contingency for its development. While multiple 
factors—and many good intentions—have informed the present legal regimes for national and 
international jurisdiction, it is also the case that these regimes cater substantially to a few 
extractive interests: some mining corporations, and their sponsoring states. This is not to say 
that the law has no potential to be deployed against extractive interests; it has increasingly 
given articulation to ecological concerns, and—in peaks and troughs—to redistributive ones. 
And more complex developments are afoot, in the form of the ISA’s ongoing drafting of the 
mining code, and the negotiation of the agreement on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. 
But, for all that these new instruments might accomplish, there remain real and pertinent 
questions about the extent to which they can undo the primacy that the law currently accords 
to the exploitation of the ocean: can the law, as the medium that facilitated the grab of the ocean 
floor in fact also serve as the medium that returns it to the common benefit? There can be no 
conclusive answer to this question; but recognising that this is what the law has done, and 
further recognising how it came to develop, must constitute the first steps of any process to 
achieve that happy result.  
  
